Statutory Interpretation

Given that judges are humans too, and it is impossible for judges to not interpret statutes based on their consciousness or at least will be influenced by their respective moral, political, philosophical views. It must be noted that the learned judges play a crucial role in the United Kingdom’s Constitution. Without the judges, the whole mechanism of the UK’s historically established constitution will collapse and lead to unwanted atrocities, for there will be no authoritative body to uphold the rule of law, to protect the human rights and be the conscious of the people.

Although under the separation of powers, the Parliament holds the sovereign power in making supreme legislations, however, the application of the legislations will be left to the courts. Thus, the final decisions are still left in the hand of the courts, under which the rule of law noted that the “the rights of an individual were not secured by a written constitution, but by the decisions of judges in ordinary law”. However, in the UK’s constitution, the Parliament still retain its sovereign power to overrule the decision of the courts as can be seen in the case of Burmah Oil v Lord Advocate. Thus, in my opinion, it is not appropriate to say that the judges are allowed to interpret statutes as they wish because, ultimately, the judges are accountable to the people and the members of House of Common in the Parliament are representing the people.

Of course, there are ways or methods of which judges are to interpret the laws. For example, the literal rule, golden rule, mischief rule and as well as the European preferred approach, the purposive approach. In fact, they are not rules at all, but are different kinds of approaches that could be adopted by the judges in interpreting statutes. Furthermore, this approaches are supplemented with certain aids and presumptions to interpretation, and all in all, judges are meant to discover the true intentions of the Parliament for passing the legislations.

In adopting literal rule, it is not possible for the judges to decide cases as they wish because under the literal rule, the judges will have to give the words in a statute their ordinary and natural meaning. Thus, the judges, basically, are not required to think nor attempt to think, since on the principle, the best way to interpret the will of Parliament is to follow the literal and exact meaning of the words they have used, even though the result will lead to an absurd or obviously unjust conclusion such as in the case of London and North Eastern Railway Co v Berriman.

However in using the golden rule, the judges can modify the words so as to avoid any absurdity and inconsistency as has approved by Lord Wensleydale in Grey v Pearson. It is said that the golden rule can help the courts put into practice of what Parliament has intended and to prevent absurdity, however, it has been noted by the Law Commission saying that the so-called ‘rule’ provided no clear meaning of an ‘absurd result’. Thus, the discretion is given to the judges in noting of what is to be absurd and what is not, showing that the judges do have a certain degree of freedom over the questions of statutory interpretation.

Nevertheless, the judges can resort to the mischief rule if the result provided by the previous two rules turn out to be unreasonable and unacceptable to the views of the judges themselves. Under the mischief rule, the judges will interpret the statute in such a way as to put a stop to the problem that Parliament was intended to address, and the four factors that judges are required to consider are laid down in Heydon’s Case. Apparently, this rule has given the judges more freedom in deciding cases rather than being confined to the words in question. Yet, it cannot be said that the judges will then decide cases “as they wish”, which is not true at all, because reasonable interpretations are still required in coming to their decisions. Unless if it is said that judges have diverted themselves from the true intention of the Parliament, that has represented the will of its people, in coming to their decisions, then the judges are to be liable for deciding cases as they wish.

Last but not least, the purposive approach is a wider approach that enable the judges to discover on what they think the true purpose of the Parliament is. Therefore, it would not just allow the court to look at the history before the act was passed, but it would also allow the judges to carry out the intention of Parliament, in a way of what the judges think it is. In fact, the House of Lords has come to accept the use of purposive approach to be appropriate, especially after the passing of Human Rights Act 1998, European Communities Act 1972, European Union Act 2011 and other constitutional legislations. Thus, solely looking at the words of the statutes are not enough in bringing the whole and true intention of the Parliament, but by looking and referring to the external aids are essential to truly understand what Parliament has actually intended when passing the statute in question.

Notwithstanding, it is undeniably that judges do have their own personal perspectives and ideologies as well as theories when making a decision. They do not, in actual cases, apply the aforementioned rules methodically. In fact, the decisions of most cases were not unanimous necessarily implies some options as to which rule is to be used. As an example in the Pinochet’s case, which was decided by two different panels of judges in the House of Lords, in interpreting the same statutory provisions came up with totally different verdicts. Therefore, the judges do have some freedom over the application of the rules of statutory interpretation.

In a nutshell, the rules of statutory interpretation could be a set of guidance, a start off, for the judges to kick start the finding of the true meaning of the words in question as to reflect the truest intention of the Parliament. All in all, statutory interpretation is about applying laws by way of delivering the intention of the Parliament in a particular case in interpreting a non-flawless statute. Therefore, the judges should have some freedom to maneuver within the rules of statutory interpretation and the given guidance provided in some other acts i.e. Interpretation Act 1978 and Human Rights Act 1998.

[1965] AC 75.

[1946] AC 278.

(1857) 6 HL Cas 61.

(1584) 3 Co Rep 7a.

State Immunity Act 1978